Beyond emissions reductions - Working group page - Mind Games At Kioloa 2008
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| Mind Games at Kioloa 2008 |
This is the working page for the amalgamated problem sets - Beyond emissions reductions and Ocean acidification
Contents |
Discussions
Much to be added/reorganised here. Below is what Roger wrote. --Steve 18:22, 15 November 2008 (EST)
Day 1
Where are the carbon pools?
- Geosphere pool
- Over long time scales, carbon is stored here by biogeochemical processes
- It is a net accumulating sink over geological time scales
- But vulcanism is a discontinuous source from the geo pool
- Biosphere pool
- Ocean pool
- Atmosphere pool
What are the politics?
- Garnaut started out 90% economics/10% politics and ended up 10% economics and 90% politics
What are the economics?
- Peak oil will complexify the problem
- Peak oil might dampen demand for fossil fuels
- But it might also encourage exploration of hard and carbon intensive deposits - tar sands
- For some purposes, coal is a substitute good for oil.
What are the characteristic time scales?
Where are the discontinuities?
Possible research questions / papers
[Please amend, this is completely from memory as I have temporarily lost my notes! --Steve 18:22, 15 November 2008 (EST)]
Short opinion letter?
A short opinion letter outlining some of the above ideas, without actually doing any scientific work.
International climate negotiations as game theory
Treat international negotiations on carbon emission reduction targets as a game theory problem. Simplify to a small number of players / blocs (developed world / developing world / rogue?). Distinguish between perceived and actual costs. Based on this game theory:
- what level of co-operation is currently likely, and what outcomes (in perceived and actual costs) is this likely to bring?
- what strategies are the players likely to adopt?
- how far must the gap between perceived and actual costs be reduced, and for whom, to acheive an acceptable outcome? Can show a range of perceived costs changes for range of outcomes and indicate where on this curve we think is acceptable.
A couple more thoughts that we didn't talk about:
- For historical comparison, also model result of Kyoto negotiations (US & Australia vs rest of developed world)?
- Possibly all the players are perceiving long-term costs of climate change correctly, but are adding to their perceived costs an unreasonably large short-term effect to the economy. This is related to the question of discount rates.
Current problems:
- How do we specify the costs??
How do different stabilisation targets correspond to levels of emissions reductions?
Given a particular stabilisation target for global carbon dioxide levels or greenhouse gas levels, how much would the world need to reduce its emissions by a certain year (e.g. 2020, 2050)? How much should Australia reduce its emissions by a certain year? I have found the following papers to be useful for this:
- Meinshausen et al. (2006) Multi-gas Emissions Pathways to Meet Climate Targets, Climatic Change 75: 151–194
- Hare and Meinshausen (2006) How Much Warming are We Committed to and How Much can be Avoided? Climatic Change 75: 111–149
The first paper suggests that a target of 350ppm CO2 would require global emissions reductions of 5.17% per year. The second paper suggests that if we were to stop emissions overnight, then CO2 levels would eventually stabilise at approximately 300 ppm.
One approach to allocating emissions reductions between countries is 'Contraction and Convergence' where countries eventually converge to equal per-capita emissions. How much a particular country emits in a particular year is then based on the convergence date and the stabilisation target (which determines the contraction rate, but this also depends on carbon cycle feedbacks). Garnaut's targets are based on a convergence date of 2050, which many would argue is unfair to developing counties and low per-capita emitters. The Global Commons Institute has a tool that can be downloaded, which estimates allocations for different countries given different convergence dates. Estimates obtained using this tool for Australia to contribute to 350ppm are 57-60% reductions for a convergence date of 2030; 45-49% reductions for a convergence date of 2040; 37-42% reductions for a convergence date of 2050 (relative to 2000 emissions). These figures are assuming that convergence starts at 2000, so if they were updated to take emissions since then into account, the reductions will become greater.
Because developed countries are also responsible for more historical emissions, Contraction and Convergence will also require some additional forms of payments, technology transfer, adaptation assistance, or aid for developing countres, before it can be considered to be truly equitable.
Literature survey
A lot's been done already. However we could still find a niche e.g. on perceived vs actual costs. Note I have not read any of the below yet. --Steve 18:22, 15 November 2008 (EST)
- Lange et al. On the Self-serving Use of Equity Principles in International Climate Negotiations
- Buchner & Carraro (2006), Parallel Climate Blocs: Incentives to cooperation in international climate negotiations
- There's even a course on it! Game Theory and Negotiations to Establish Cooperation in the Areas of the Environment, Trade, and Human Rights
- Okada (2007), International Negotiations on Climate Change: A Noncooperative Game Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol
- Caparros et al. (2005), North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information
- Even the IPCC reports apparently have a bit on game theory in negotiations. [1]
- International negotiations paralyzed by domestic politics: two-level game theory and the problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission.
- "Climate Change, International Negotiations and Belgian Strategies". This details a group in Belgium looking at climate change negotiations from a variety of perspectives, including game theory.
- Courtois and Tazdaït (2007), Ecological Modelling Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions
I think we could also explore the equity issue further using this approach --Jess 09:52, 17 November 2008 (EST)
- Raupach et al. (2007), recommended by Roger Global and regional drivers of accelerating CO2 emissions
More references can be found at [2]. Wood545 12:36, 13 January 2009 (EST)
Books
- Michael Finus (2001) Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation, Edward Elgar Publishing
- Robert Axelrod (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books
- Robert Axelrod (1997) The Complexity of Cooperation, Princeton University Press
- Thomas Schelling (1960, 1980) The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press
- Scott Barrett (2003) Environment and Statecraft – The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making, Oxford University Press
Press release
Climate chickens, a game of political will
International climate change negotiations have more in common with a game of “chicken” than meets the eye, according to a cross-disciplinary group of young researchers.
Their study argues that the link is a type of mathematics called Game Theory. “This understanding of decision making may help clear the way towards a solution to climate change, the most urgent problem of our generation” said Jessica Melbourne-Thomas, previous Rhodes Scholar and member of the group.
The study uses Game Theory to explore the ways that governments in developed and developing countries might make decisions in the future about carbon trading and carbon emission reductions. The game explores how these ‘players’ act given incentives for change but limited knowledge about the possibility of a disastrous head-on collision, if players fail to cooperate.
The break-through of this approach is the ability to look at the consequences of gaps between the risks from climate change that governments recognise, and the risks scientists know are likely to be true, due to complex climate feedbacks.
“Given that the most significant barriers to reducing greenhouse gas emissions are political,” said Ms Melbourne-Thomas, “approaches like this are critical for working towards long-term international solutions.”
14 November 2008
